DAVID F. CAVERS
ERWIN

N.

GRISWOLD*

David F. Cavers was a child of the twentieth century, born in its second
year, in Buffalo, New York. He became one of the leading law professors of
his generation, widely known, greatly respected, and much admired. Among
his many contributions, particular reference may be made to his influence on
law teaching and on the development of thought in the field of conflict of
laws.
I first heard of David Cavers when I came to Cambridge as a first-year
student in the fall of 1925. He was, that year, president of the Harvard Law
Review, and thus only dimly seen by a first-year student. He received his law
degree in 1926, and then went off to practice law in New York for three years.
In 1929-30, he returned to Harvard as a graduate student, holding
appointment as the Ezra Ripley Thayer Teaching Fellow in 1930. He then
taught for a year at West Virginia Law School and went on from there to the
Duke University Law School, where he was a member of the faculty for
fourteen years. In 1945 he returned to Harvard, where he was Professor of
Law for twenty-four years, until his retirement in 1969. He also served as
Associate Dean of the Law School for seven years, from 1951 to 1958.
These are the formal records of his career, but they do not begin to tell the
story.** He had an inquiring, penetrating, and innovative mind. He was also
something of an iconoclast,' and he could be quite persistent.2 Nothing in the
law, or in the practices of a law school, could be so firmly settled that
justification was not required.
This process began very early in his career. For a long generation,
Professor Joseph Henry Beale was the embodiment of conflict of laws at the
Harvard Law School, following intellectually down the path so brilliantly
outlined by Joseph Story and advanced by Albert V. Dicey in England.
Professor Beale's "vested rights" theory, sometimes irreverently called the
"checker board" theory, was the orthodoxy of our law school days. It had
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already been severely criticized by Professors Walter Wheeler Cook 3 and
Ernst Lorenzen 4 at Yale. These authors were devastating in their attacks on
the inevitability of the vested rights theory, but they were largely destructive.
They did not come up with any very good bases for resolving the conflicts
questions which arise so frequently in a federal nation. Often, the best that
they could propose was that courts should seek the "just" result, which really
left the field wide open, with little that could be called "law." David Cavers
moved slowly into the field. His first article was conventionally entitled
5
"Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws."
Soon thereafter David Cavers was appointed to the Duke University Law
School faculty, where he quickly showed his capacity as an innovator. Only
two years later, he published one of the seminal articles in the conflicts field.
It was called "A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem." ' 6 I can remember
that Professor Beale was pained by this article, but it did clearly evidence
David Cavers' desire to make constructive contributions in the field.
At about this time, he made another careful and thoughtful suggestion at
Duke, which brought about the establishment of "a New Type of legal
Periodical." 7 This new type of publication was Law and Contemporary Problems,
now in its fifty-fifth year. David Cavers was its vigorous editor for ten years,
from 1933 to 1943.
When World War II engulfed the country, David Cavers became Assistant
and then Associate General Counsel of the Office of Price Administration in
Washington. During this period, he became famous for the skill with which he
made the regulations of the Price Administration intelligible to the average
businessman. He simplified them and put them into the second person rather
than into legislative language: "If you want to do so and so, you must obtain
permission from the local Price Administration Office. The addresses of these
offices are on the last page of this notice. You go there, and obtain a copy of
Form XYZ. You provide the information requested ...."-and so on. This
was known as "Caverizing" the language, and it received widespread
approval, even from such an august authority as the Wall Street Journal.
In 1945, David Cavers returned to Harvard, where he made his home and
extraordinary contribution for the next forty-three years. He was a quiet
gentleman, but he could be very tenacious. He was widely liked by students
and by faculty members. He was universally respected. During his period in
Cambridge, he made important contributions in at least three areas.
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The first of these areas was legal education. He played a leading role in
the immediate post-War period in developing the program of teaching
fellows, and the group work program which they conducted. He undertook
the task of supervising the teaching fellows, which meant that he provided
constant leadership for them, as well as an outstanding role model. Out of
this grew a seminar in legal education, which he conducted primarily for the
teaching fellows and for graduate students who were thinking of entering law
teaching."
His second contribution was in the field of research. I had long sought to
advance the idea that the function of a great university law school is not
merely to pass on the knowledge and the techniques and the thinking which
has accumulated, but is also to develop new knowledge, new materials, new
ideas which will help to resolve both new and old problems. With this idea in
mind, I participated in bringing HaroldJ. Berman to the Law School faculty to
develop knowledge in the field of Soviet law. But I quickly saw that
developing research required a more innovative mind than mine and required
much time which I did not have available if I were to meet my other
responsibilities. Indeed, it is not easy to know what research in law consists
of. Some faculty members may feel that it is accomplished by reading and
pondering, without production; but I wanted more. So I talked with Dave,
and finally persuaded him to undertake the task of fostering, encouraging,
and developing research at the Harvard Law School. He was appointed
Associate Dean of the School with this objective in mind. He entered on these
duties energetically and imaginatively. 9 He encouraged International Legal
Studies' ° and the Foreign Tax Program, which was started by the initiative of
Stanley Surrey. He developed some of the early research in the field of
nuclear energy, and its regulation,' and the work of Robert Keeton and
Jeffrey O'Conell on no-fault insurance was begun with his encouragement. In
the process, he made contact with the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of
Law from 1958 to 1969, thus encouraging research at Harvard and at several
other law schools.
Finally, and perhaps most important, David Cavers continued his work in
the conflict of laws. He wrote a Comment called "The Two 'Local Law'
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Theories,"' 12 and other articles.' 3 This ultimately led to his great work
entitled The Choice of Law Process, published in 1965, based upon the Cooley
Lectures which he gave at the University of Michigan Law School.
During this period, the coherence of the field of conflict of laws was being
rapidly demolished by the effect on the courts of the negative approaches
begun by Professors Cook and Lorenzen, and carried on by Professor
Brainerd Currie, David's successor at the Duke Law School. These writers
had shown well enough that the orthodox approach of the nineteenth century
was not inevitable, but they had not provided a workable substitute which
would guide conflict of laws decisions by some sort of a rational approach. It
was suggested, for example, that courts having conflict of laws cases should
seek to reach the "just" result-which left everything wide open. Or, it was
suggested that courts should apply the "better" law, or should always apply
the law of the forum, which is, of course, a complete denial of any role for the
conflict of laws. Much was written about "interest analysis," without ever
providing a workable or even rational way to evaluate states' "interest" in any
particular event which happened to occur within its borders. Among other
things, predictability was almost completely lost, except for the fact that the
plaintiff nearly always won.
The net result has been, in my view, a kind of chaos in much of the conflict
of laws field, but David Cavers sought to develop a more rational approach.
He developed "principles of preference," which he explained at length in his
book and in subsequent articles, particularly in one called "The Value of
Principled Preferences," published in the Texas Law Review in 1971.'

4

Some day, some sort of rationality will be restored to the conflict of laws
field. When that day comes, we should be aware of our great indebtedness to
David Cavers.
He was a fine teacher, a wise and thoughtful scholar, a good and steady
colleague, and a rewarding companion. His contributions to the Harvard Law
School, and to the law, are of the first order. His support and help and
friendship were of great satisfaction to me during my years as Dean.
Our colleague, Dave, had a long and productive life. As Thomas Mann
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time friend. We are all better for having had the privilege of working with him
here.
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